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Turnaround or Contract Merger: A conceptual model to protect sick and 
government companies 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The prolific competition and unanticipated customer loyalty gave the ideological thought to 
craft combat strategies among firms, now it became a warriors’ battle. To achieve this, global 
firms are designing tactics to become a gladiator by choosing merger & acquisition as a 
synergistic choice. M&A is an opportunity for target firm shareholders in a high premium, on 
the other hand escalating monopoly by an acquirer in the respective market. These inorganic 
options will increase the capitalism in mixed economy countries that result in the loss of 
government control on public sector enterprises and sick industries. Availing this gap, the 
present conceptual study is aimed to introduce a new weapon for emerging market nations to 
protect state control and keep public belief. Exclusively, we try to accommodate and suggest 
a new financial arrangement or scheme against the existing model, i.e. Leveraged buyout 
(LBO). Finally, this array is supported by the Indian sick industries as case examples which 
were disappearing now. It also ensures that the economic sustainability and progress of nation 
would be achieved by the proposed ‘Contract Merger’ model.   
 
Keywords: Corporate restructuring, turnaround, merger, acquisition, LBO, disinvestment 
 
Important notes to Readers: 
 
Thank you very much for reading my academic work.  
 
This draft was prepared as part of my doctoral thesis carried out at the IIT Roorkee, India 
during the period Dec 2009 – Sept 2014. Due to several rounds of revisions after my doctoral 
presentation, I have finally published the part of this draft with significant improvements in a 
referred international journal published by InderScience Ltd. Therefore, if you consider citing 
this draft, you may have to consider citing the following article. 
 
Reddy, K. S., Xie, E., & Huang, Y. (2016). Contractual buyout-a legitimate growth model in 
the enterprise development: foundations and implications. International Journal of 
Management and Enterprise Development, 15(1), 1-23. Scopus, ABDC Ranked.   
 
Also, see http://econpapers.repec.org/RAS/pko531.htm  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Augmentation is a fundamental to sustain the practicality, vitality and value enhancing 
capability of a company. Further, corporate restructuring refers to the change in ownership, 
business mix, asset mix and alliances to enhance the shareholder’s value (Kumar and Rajib, 
2007; Pandey, 2009). Merger, acquisition and diversification have become in touch-pads of 
great importance in the global business arena. From the review, we observe that firms engage 
in joint ventures, enter management contracts, buy other firms, divest segments and 
restructure in many different ways for firm enlargement and enrichment (Weston, Chung and 
Hoag, 1998; Pandey, 2009; Reddy, 2014; Chandra, 2008). The term M&A is often confused 
or used interchangeably by the business media. A merger typically refers that two companies 
coming together to become one (Sherman, 1998). To protect state control and sick companies 
in this global competition, we aim to introduce a model that can sustain the economic life of 
industries and reduce the monopoly power. The model is illustrated by the Indian cases and 
recommends the government to enact a new regulation through concerned division. Neither 
the case, we suggest the state to put up a committee for ensuring good economic health and 
corporate control on government companies.     
 
Historically, M&A was born in the timeline of Kings. After advancement in human living life 
and social studies, the true pinpointed first wave of mergers consisted primarily of horizontal 
mergers, the second wave transfer to vertical and the third wave publicized by conglomerate 
mergers (Weston, Chung and Hoag, 1998). There are several motives or reasons behind the 
M&A deal (Srinivasan and Mishra, 2007; Kumar and Rajib, 2007). Generally, the most 
common motive is expanding: horizontally or vertically and in related or unrelated 
businesses. In general, acquiring a company in the line of business or geographical area in 
which the firm may want to expand can be a quick way to expand than internal expansion 
(Ray, 2010). M&A serve managerial motives that do not maximize shareholder returns, i.e. 
Sales – increasing the sales team prefers to acquire even at high prices (Muller, 1969). During 
80s, virtually half of all US companies were acquired or merged and over 700000 sought 
bankruptcy protection to continue their operations. The global village has forced many 
companies to explore M&A as a mean to develop an international platform and expanded 
market share (Sherman, 1998). 
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The general drivers of M&A especially in Russia, includes continuing concentration of 
capital, globalization of company activity and liberalized access to national markets 
(Kasparova, 2007). All these factors ease the free movement of investment flows among 
cross-borders. During 2007-financial crisis, volume and value of international M&A had 
been falling down in both western and developing nations and it has been continued up to 
2009-10 (Rao & Reddy, 2015; UNCTAD, 2009). From 2007, the M&A waves spur at a 
superior growth rate in almost all the nations. It evidences that the transactions have become 
more widespread in energy, oil & gas, chemicals, automobiles, steels, telecommunications, 
financial services and other allied industries. 
 
The remaining paper is articulated in the following conduct. Section 2 presents the review of 
select & relevant past studies, section 3 describes the conceptual foundation to propose a 
financial array, section 4 illustrates the model with case approach and conclusions cum future 
scope of research depict in section 5. 
 
REVIEW OF EXISTING STUDIES 
 
Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and leveraged cash-outs (LCOs) are the next wave after the end 
of conglomerate mergers in 1980s. Mergers had been proving to significant increases in 
financial leverage by controlling the firm size and industry effects (Shrieves and Pashley, 
1984). In the context of buyouts, during the 1980s merger wave, corporate sector of the 
American economy was left with an enormous increase in its debt/equity ratio (Jensen, 1984). 
To add this 'Going Private' refers to the transmission of a public corporation into a privately 
held firm. On the other hand, LBO has become an increasingly frequent form of business 
streamlining. LBO is the acquisition financed largely by borrowing of all the stock or assets 
of a hitherto public company by a small group of investors (Ray, 2010). 
 
In its earlier versions, an LBO was a practice by which the owner/founder seeking to cash out 
his investment transferred the firm to manage or younger family members, who can put up a 
small amount of capital and borrow the rest (Kosedag, Mehran and Qian, 2009). Further LBO 
is an acquisition of a company in which the acquisition is substantially financed through debt. 
There are relevant studies on LBOs, the most prominent ones are cost savings, exchange 
listing, tax savings, agency costs, free cash flow and informational advantages of managers. 
LBO is deemed the most efficient in enhancing the oversight of the public firm while without 
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effective administrative control on firm operations (Bowman, et al., 1999). Braun and 
Latham (2009) examine the governance structure of the firm undergoing a complete reverse 
leveraged buyout cycle. 
 
Generally, buyouts mostly funded by the investment bankers as debt. In an LBO, debt 
financing typically represents 50 percent or more of the purchase price. The debt is secured 
by the assets of an acquired firm find typically amortized over a period of less than ten years 
(Kasparova, 2007). The debt is scheduled to be paid off as operations generated funds or 
from the sale of the assets of the acquired firm. Figure 1 represents the existing model of the 
LBO and participation of the parties/transactions involved. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Literature evidences that LBO was a financing technique through, which a public company is 
bought mostly with debt making the public company as private. LBO means that borrowed 
funds are used to pay for all or most of the purchase price of the acquisition of a company as 
a whole or any of its divisions. Traditionally in more than 90 per cent of the LBO 
transactions, the purchase price of an acquisition has been financed with debt and the tangible 
assets of the target firm that have been used as collateral for the loans (Ray, 2010; Machiraju, 
2010). The essence of LBO consists in the acquisition of a controlling share of a company 
using borrowed funds. In Russia so far, there have been only a handful of LBOs and these are 
financed 100 percent by bank credit using the property of the purchased asset collateral. 
Transparent LBO transactions in the Russian market are quite rare. But the problem lies in 
finding suitable targets for LBOs. Banks are often unwilling to finance such a deal in full and 
assume the risks of the collateralized asset. Another type of deal in Russia is that finance by 
accumulating the debts of the company to be taken over and then converting them into 
company shares in the bankruptcy process (Kasparova, 2007). 
 
The financial arrangement is an art of structured and mechanized framework which is done 
by strategic board members and the array can be linked with virtual common sense. It is a 
major concern for bidders who are anxious to clinch their bid that consummate with the 
acquisition strategy in terms of tempo and price. Information asymmetry and valuation risk 
are important determinants of the choice between cash and share exchange offers (Ray, 
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2010). The cash offer is made by bidders, who attach a high value to the target of their bid 
and signal their confidence that the target firm will remain to be a high value company under 
their control (Fishman, 1989). The range of options available to a buyer to finance an 
acquisition range from the very simple to the very complex and designing deal model will 
vary with each transaction (Damodaran, 2002). There are common sources of finance an 
acquisition in the capital market, which they include seller as a source of financing, debt 
finance (includes asset based lending, senior debt, convertible debt and subordinated debt) 
and equity finance includes venture capital, private placement offerings, strategic investors 
and buyout funds (Sherman, 1998; Pandey, 2009).  
 
Most of the early studies found that mergers increase leverage and that the argument is due to 
increased debt capacity rather than utilization of latent debt capacity (Weston, Chung and 
Hoag, 1998). It observes that financing M&A transaction in Russia concerns assorted 
frameworks for the transfer of corporate control. The majority of Russian companies was 
formed in the process of privatization and conversion into joint-stock companies (Kasparova, 
2007). Further the relation between bidder gains and the source of financing funds available. 
Bidder announcement period abnormal returns are positively and significantly related to the 
amount of ex ante equity financing. Further, it reports a negative and significant relation 
between bidder gains and free cash flow. Though, the amount of debt financing before a 
takeover announcement is not related to bidder gains (Schlingemann, 2004). 
 
Interestingly in the milieu of corporate laws and governance, Braun and Latham (2007) 
discover the board of directors in leveraged buyouts as a distinct source of value creation and 
to conceptually investigate the going private transaction via LBO as a response to deficient to 
governance structures. Though there are factors influencing the decision to go private via 
buyout in UK public firms (Weir, et al., 2005). Board independence and CEO duality take 
part as predictors in their study. In case of reverse LBOs, Gertner and Kaplan (1996) compare 
59 reverse LBO board structures to industry and size matched public firms over the course of 
two years following their secondary initial public offers. In the US economic context, Krause 
(1989) describes that LBOs have achieved remarkable success in return on investment and 
value creation despite the fact that their borrowing costs are very high on a comparative basis. 
Though, they have also injected new life into the economy by creating lean competitors out 
of tired, family-run firms and bloated corporate subsidiaries. 
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In the case of sick company’s turnaround strategy, Khandwalla (1992) suggest seven sets of 
activities to develop four typologies of a turnaround strategy based on retrenchment of people 
and technology up-gradation. Conversely, Robbins and Pearce (1992) divide turnaround 
strategy into an efficiency driven and competition driven. Most of the studies in turnaround 
administration conclude that all typology efforts have been a manpower reduction to orbit 
organizations. Further, the market for corporate control appears to be developing in India 
through the enforcement of managerial discipline after merger incidences (Ramakrishnan, 
2010). 
 
Since the focus part, M&A had more than 120 years of vast literature in the corporate finance 
as well as management cosmos. Though, all the glorious existing studies had written and 
published in western economies which are developed nations in the economic context. Even 
most of the theories, concepts, valuation practices and integration approaches have not fit or 
overly loaded while applying the same in developing nations, India. One gold ring does not 
suit every ones finger and every finger, likewise all fingers are not equal. To grasp this 
opportunity and achieve the objective of the study, the new model/theory would be added to 
M&A history for the benefit of third world countries/emerging nations. In the next section, 
we present the proposed model as a theoretical base. In the next section, we present the 
conceptual model which is the main motto behind our study.  
 
CONTRACT MERGER 
 
Contract Merger (CM) is an extension of leveraged buyout (LBO), which would be a part of 
the inorganic growth strategy. Further, it seems to be a ‘Futures Contract’ in the derivatives 
market. The merger agreement will be taken place before the true mix of balance sheets of 
both the companies, i.e. acquirer and target firm. After the agreement, the acquirer firm will 
create a subsidiary unit for joint management & control operations with the target firm 
corporate board. It means that the acquirer will share their expertise, technology, manpower 
and operational activities with the target firm to strengthen the financial position, employee 
belongings and corporate responsibility in their respective industry. In addition to this, it is 
protecting the public interest through the virtual acquisition of the target firm by investing the 
required amount with the financial courtesy of an investment banker or leveraged banker in 
the form debt. Specifically, the acquirer firm would be giving an acknowledgement of 
guarantee for the amount of debt funded by the lender.  
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Definition of Contract Merger 
Three or more parties agree to form a combined entity or living like a single entity after the 
immediate collapse of CM Deed/MoU/Agreement, after settlement of agreed financial 
arrangements among the involved parties which usually occur on the premises of the court is 
called a contract merger. 
 
Mandatory Parties 
Acquire, Target firm and Investment banker/Lender 
 
Insert Box 1 about here 
 
Elements of the Agreement 
1) CM should have three parties namely, Acquirer, Target firm and Lender 
2) Acquirer company should be or more than 2.5 times of target firm business value 
3) It is not necessary that the parties should be on the same business line. It can be a 
conglomerate 
4) Reasons for merging the target firm balance sheet with acquirer balance sheet should be 
on the following primary/border line of the CM model. 
a) Disinvestment 
b) Turnaround strategy 
c) Corporate restructuring 
d) Looking for expansion 
e) Entry of new markets 
f) Diversification as a choice 
g) Party's interest in the context of law 
5) Parties should express their utmost belief, interest and law of concern to enter CM 
6) They should explicit their issues and contingencies if any, before CM negotiations/deed 
7) Parties should appoint their financial and legal advisors as a proxy evidence 
8) Parties should satisfy the leverage norms, guidelines and requirements for grant of debt 
by the select investment banker 
9) After financial arrangement, the acquirer will be signing a deed/MoU/agreement with the 
target firm, which contains the following information and signed by both the parties, as 
well as authentication by a bank on the deed document is called “Contract Merger”. 
a) Date of contract 
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b) Date of writing/signing the document 
c) Name and address of the parties 
d) Name and address of the lender 
e) The amount of financial arrangement 
f) The rate of interest 
g) Payment options & pay procedure 
h) Sharing of technology, manpower, expertise and resource allocation, etc. 
10) Acquirer will get a certain percent of commission on future sales of the target firm from 
the half of the agreed time. The agreement time ranges from five to seven years.  
11) The target firm will pay the interest amount from third year onwards until the agreed time 
completed. From 5
th
 year onwards, the target firm will pay both interest and principal 
amount. If any principal amount left in the deed, that amount will be partially paid by an 
acquirer through its subsidiary company. 
12) If target firms do not want to continue like a single entity after the collapse of an 
agreement, it should merge with the acquirer. Further the two balance sheets will merge 
after paying the debt obligations of the target firm by subsidiary firm of the acquirer.  
13) If a target firm wants to continue like a single entity, first the CM deed should wind up 
along with financial arrangements, which was funded by investment bankers. 
14) Next, obtaining ‘No Objection Certificate’ from all the parties with seal in the premises of 
court, later target firm can continue their own life. From the first year closing of 
agreement time, the target firm should not merge or acquire or takeover with, or by any 
other company.  
15) The following conditions should satisfy while the deed (CM) turns on 
a) No party shall try to void the contract 
b) If an acquirer wants to break up or not to continue the corporate life with the target 
firm, the acquirer should repay the commission which was received earlier and clear 
the remaining amount of debt. Even it before one day to complete the CM deed. 
c) If a target firm wants to break up their deed with acquirer before the completion date, 
simply it has to merge with the acquirer and the remaining debt amount with interest 
will be paid by the acquirer. 
d) During the agreement time, an acquirer can buy any other assets or business units or 
equity stake in the global market. Or it can sell its own stake to some other party, but 
the other party should consider a CM deed as a contingent liability. 
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e) During the agreed time, target firm can’t sell its equity or asset stake or control to 
someone or enter any agreement without the board approval of the acquirer firm.  
f) Further no company/no person to buy the target company during the CM deed. 
 
Insert Box 2 about here 
 
Contract Merger Model 
The proposed contract merger model is depicted in Figure 2 below. This model explains the 
involvement of parties, actions which take place between the parties and finally how the 
merger will occur from the new CM model. Further it also explains various issues related to 
participation in the contract merger. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Further, the model or theory depicts in the Figure 3 below. This presentation portrays three 
phases namely the contract merger period, simple merger and single entity, which are the 
main streams of contract merger. The following illustration contrary the model ‘contract 
merger’ and how it could be executed (see my full paper, Reddy et al., 2016; also how I 
developed a model based on Test-Tube method, Reddy, 2015a; Reddy, 2015b).  
 
Illustration: Company A’ is a registered and public listed entity has been resulting losses 
since five consecutive years. Though, the peers in the industry showed dropdown in their 
profits for the last two years. At this juncture, diversified & profit making company B entered 
‘contract merger deed’ with company A. The agreement/deed had written for the period of 
five years. After the windup of deed, company A’ show relative profit and it represents as 
contract merger period with turnaround curve (see Figure 3). From this point, if company A 
wants to be living their presence as a single entity or it may simply merge with company B.      
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
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CASE ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
The study believes that contract merger model would be fit for the emerging economies 
(BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and other third world nations. 
Economic reforms and liberalization of policies on the Indian economy has brought in more 
domestic as well as international players in the Indian industries. The first wave of M&A in 
India took place towards the end of 1990s (Machiraju, 2010; Reddy, 2016; Reddy et al., 
2013a; Reddy et al., 2013b; Reddy et al., 2015). However, we present some of the realistic 
case examples in sick industries and suggest PSUs that should be taken control over by the 
government through the proposed model. 
 
Sick industries in India 
Sinha (1998) expresses that companies are getting a tax advantage by acquiring sick 
companies and evidences that Universal Steel & Alloys Ltd (USAL) had declared a sick 
company by the Board for Industrial & Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), and merged with 
Bharat Gears Ltd. Bharat Gears proposes to raise foreign currency loans and/or rupee loan for 
Rs.100 crore from banks, financial institutions, investment institutions, etc., to part finance its 
expansion plans. To secure the loan, the company intends to mortgage its movable and/or 
immovable assets at its factories in India. Apart from getting hold of the USAL properties, 
the merger would have made Bharat Gears eligible for tax benefits under Section 72A of the 
Income Tax (IT) Act, 1961, as USAL has a large amount of carry-forward losses. 
 
In the cement industry, Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd acquired Modi Cements, which was 
declared as a BIFR company, and got tax exemptions. Further, it amalgamated with Ambuja 
Cements Rajasthan then received tax benefits under Section 72A and Section 115JB of the IT 
Act, 1961. Interestingly, Grasim Industries Ltd had taken over Dharani Cement for getting 
sales tax benefits over six years; in other cases India Cements Ltd also acquired the public 
sector undertakings, Cement Corporation of India. The tax shelter benefits would provide an 
added incentive for bigger companies to target sick units (Sasi and Mishra, 2004). 
 
Indian Public Sector Undertakings 
Exclusively, the literature on the proposed model recommends Govt. of India and other 
emerging nations to be executed in the select public sector undertakings (PSUs). This model 
keeps the state control with utmost belief and promises the public governance for smooth 
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functioning of the democratic system. The list of suggest PSUs include MMTC, NNMDC, 
Hindustan Copper Limited, HMT Limited, Ircon International Limited and Scooters India 
Limited, etc. (Refer: Appendix-I). We suggest 16 out of 39 PSUs that are suitable to execute 
the CM model on the recommended grounds and in the context of law. Though, the 
government/state is essential to alter their laws related to disinvestment and privatization. To 
confirm the model, authorities can carry out in any select sick unit on trial and error basis.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Surging M&A and private equity (PE) deals in the emerging economies, like India and other 
BRICS countries would require keeping their public administrative control in the key areas 
such as the public system, public administration and focused industries/PSUs for the sake of 
public interest. Since India is a young country in many discoveries, inventions and 
developments. Going for internationalization might promises economic growth but associated 
risks is involved. The study concludes that suggest a contract merger model would benefit the 
states in developing countries as a fit framework for government control as well as a strategic 
advantage like inorganic growth opportunities. As a contribution and advancement of theory 
in the M&A area, the propose contract merger framework will open the doors for future 
research contributors by raising various issues related to that how far the suggest model fit to 
protect state control, beneficial to sick industries, does it produce favorable results compare 
to other models or it suits by altering some provisions in the model.   
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Box 1: Eligible Criteria for Contract Merger 
Eligible Criteria of Acquirer Eligible Criteria of the Target firm 
a. Registered in India under the Companies 
Act, 1956 
b. Good report on Corporate governance 
c. It can be private/publicly listed entity but 
should not be a subsidiary of any group 
d. Sound financial backdrop during the last 
five years 
e. Prove 2/3 majority of the board of 
directors 
f. The net worth of acquirer should be 
thrice, what actually the loan amount 
funded by investment bankers 
g. If a target firm becomes insolvent, the 
acquirer is legally liable to pay both 
interest and principal amount 
a. Poor financial backdrop 
b. Corporate restructuring & business 
process reengineering 
c. Turnaround strategy 
d. Sick or proposed to disinvest 
 
Eligible Criteria of Investment Banker 
a. The banks should be registered under the RBI guidelines and the entity may be a public 
sector bank or private bank or investment bank or established MNC banks or an Indian 
subsidiary of an International bank. 
b. Agree to fund the agreed amount before the CM deed takes place between the parties 
c. Collect/receive at time of payment of the interest / principal amount 
d. Should be liable and binding for the rules 
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Box 2: Fundamentals of Contract Merger 
Benefits of CM Benefits for the Acquirer 
a. Stop the monopoly player in the market 
b. Regulate one man control in the industry 
c. Independence to live in the business 
d. Free flow of transparency 
e. Public interest and public governance 
a. Building reputation and brand image 
b. Social responsibility in the business context, 
specifically in sick segments/units 
c. Acquirer will get a certain percent of 
commission on sales of the target firm 
d. Acquirer will get an advanced experience in 
the unrelated businesses 
e. Acquirer can excise his option to buy the 
target firm like a forward contract by taking 
a written concern from the board of 
directors 
f. It can rise free cash flows and reserves & 
surpluses 
Benefits for a Target firm Benefits for the Lender 
a. Giving new birth to old firm 
b. Protect the employee and customer 
belongings of the target firm 
c. Public and social interest 
d. The existence of the market 
a. Mortgage of acquirer and target firm assets 
& securities 
b. Timely payment of interest and principal 
amount 
c. Reengagement of the loan amount with 
other firms 
d. Corporate customer portfolio 
Pre- CM period Post – CM period 
a. Gather all the parties along with financial 
and legal advisors at one place 
b. The negotiation talks should lead to deal 
structure 
c. Valuation of both the entities by financial 
advisors 
d. Decide the required amount which will be 
funded by the investment bank 
e. Plan of action and strategies will be 
developed by both the acquirer and target 
firm 
f. Documents to be ready for authentication 
and it are mandatory 
g. There are 5 copies – acquirer copy, target 
firm copy, lender copy, state legislative 
copy and company registration copy 
a. Implementation of program/plan of action 
b. Integrating the subsidiary company 
operations with the target firm 
c. Pay interest/collect commission/manage 
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Figure 1: LBO Model (Ray, 2010) 
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Figure 2: Contract Merger Model (CM) 
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Figure 3: Contract Merger - Merger/Single Entity Curve 
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Appendix I: Proposed Disinvestment of Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) in India 
S.No Name of the PSU Market Cap 
(US$ MM) 
Govt. 
Holding (%) 
Stake that 
can be 
divested (%) 
1 ONGC Limited 44,486 74 23 
2 NTPC Limited 33,351 89 38 
3 MMTC Limited 28,812 99 48 
4 NMDC Limited 27,146 98 47 
5 BHEL Limited 20,624 68 17 
6 Indian Oil Corporation Limited 14,365 79 28 
7 Steel Authority of India Limited 13,166 86 35 
8 Power Grid Corporation of India Limited 9,023 86 35 
9 Gas Authority of India Limited 8,578 57 6 
10 Hindustan Copper Limited 4,676 100 49 
11 Power Finance Corporation 4,602 90 39 
12 Neyveli Lignite Corporation 4,109 94 43 
13 National Aluminium Company Limited 3,774 87 36 
14 Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited 3,559 55 4 
15 Rural Electrification Corporation 2,796 82 31 
16 Container Corporation of India Limited 2,588 63 12 
17 Mangalore Refinery & Petro-chemicals Limited 2,569 89 38 
18 Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited 2,356 51 0 
19 Bharat Electronics Limited 2,315 76 25 
20 Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited 1,191 56 5 
21 Engineers India Limited 1,071 90 39 
22 Shipping Corporation of India Limited 1,043 80 29 
23 BEML Limited 905 54 3 
24 Rashtriya Chemicals & Fertilizers Limited 709 93 42 
25 HMT Limited 573 99 48 
26 Chennai Petroleum Corporation Limited 522 52 1 
27 National Fertilizers Limited 500 98 47 
28 State Trading Corporation of India Limited 402 91 40 
29 Andrew Yule & Company Limited 304 94 43 
30 Dredging Corporation of India Limited 252 79 28 
31 ITI Limited 239 93 42 
32 Indian Tourism Development 140 90 39 
33 Hindustan Photo Films Manufacturing Limited 123 91 40 
34 Ircon International Limited 63 100 49 
35 Hindustan Organic Chemicals Limited 43 59 8 
36 Balmer Lawrie Investments 41 60 9 
37 Madras Fertilizers Limited 32 60 9 
38 Scooters India Limited 21 95 44 
39 Bharat Immunologicals & Bio Limited 20 59 8 
Source: Dalal Street. Biz, 10 July, 2009 
 
 
